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Abstract
We analyze how termination charges a¤ect retail prices when taking into account
that receivers derive some utility from a call and when rms may charge consumers for
receiving calls. A novel feature of our paper is that we consider passive self-fullling
expectations and do not allow for negative reception charges. We reconrm the nding
of prot neutrality when rms cannot use termination-based price discrimination and
show that connectivity is prone to breakdown.
Keywords: Bill and Keep; Call externality; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Re-
ceiver pays; Consumer Expectations
JEL classication: D43; K23; L51; L96
1 Introduction
Although the telecommunications sector has been liberalized in most industrialized countries,
some regulation remains. A clear example is call termination on mobile telephone networks.
Mobile operators interconnect their networks so that their customers can communicate with
the customers of other networks. This requires mobile operators to provide a wholesale
service called call termination, whereby each completes a call made to one of its subscribers
by a caller on another network. In most countries, call termination is provided in exchange
for a fee or access charge, which is also called mobile termination rate. Indeed, above-cost
termination rates is a notorious feature of most of the European markets. A second feature
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of these markets is that users do not pay for receiving calls, i.e., the so-called "calling party
pays" (CPP) principle.
There are two types of call termination: termination of calls originated on the xed-line
telephone network (xed-to-mobile FTM termination) and termination of calls originated on
other mobile networks (mobile-to-mobile MTM termination). There is a consensus that if
FTM termination rates are left unregulated, then mobile operators will unilaterally set too
high termination rates. As a mobile user usually join just one mobile network, the network
to which she subscribes is the only that can provide the service of call termination. Unlike
FTM rates, MTM rates inate the cost of the o¤-net calls (i.e., those calls originated on a
network and completed on a di¤erent network), and thus a¤ect competition (and e¢ ciency)
in the retail market for mobile telephony.
Starting with the seminal works of Armstrong (1998) and La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a,
b) (henceforth ALRT), a burgeoning literature that analyses the impact of termination rates
on competition has emerged.1 Nevertheless, most of the theoretical work on mobile network
interconnection typically assumed that consumers derive utility only from making calls,
ignoring the existence of call externalities   that is, the fact that not only callers but also
receivers of a call enjoy a positive benet.2
The possibility that the receiving party enjoy benets from a call is clearly important
for the manner in which rms compete in the retail market. Once it is recognized that
consumers enjoy benets from receiving a call, it follows that they are prepared to pay for
this. Indeed, in some countries (e.g. Canada, Singapore, Hong Kong and the United States)
mobile operators charge their subscribers for the calls they receive. The objective of this
paper is to explore the implications of call externalities and termination rates for pricing
under the possibility that mobile operators can charge both outgoing and incoming calls,
which is known as the receiver-pays regime.
An incipient literature has started to examine the relationship between termination rates
and equilibrium prices in an environment with call externalities (Kim and Lim [2001]; De-
Graba [2003]; Hahn [2003]; La¤ont et al. [2003]; Jeon et al. [2004]; Berger [2004, 2005];
Hermalin and Katz [2001, 2004, 2006]; Cambini and Valletti [2008]; López [2010]).3 La¤ont
1For a complete review of the literature on access charges see Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003) and
Peitz et al. (2004).
2One assumption that is invoked to justify the absence of call externalities in models of network com-
petition is that call externalities could be largely internalized by the parties (see Competition Commission
[2003, paras 8.257 to 8.260]). However, as argued by Hermalin and Katz (2004, p. 424), "this assumption is
applicable only to a limited set of situations in which either the communicating parties behave altruistically
or have a repeated relationship". Additionally, Harbord and Pagnozzi [2010] argue that the empirical basis
for the internalization of call externalities is unclear.
3Jeon et al. (2004) provides a short overview of the literature on competition in the presence of call
externalities.
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et al. (2003; LMRT hereafter), Jeon et al. (2004; JLT hereafter), Hermalin and Katz (2006),
Cambini and Valletti (2008) and López (2010) are the papers closest to ours. LMRT analyze
Internet backbone competition and assume that there exist two types of users: websites
(senders) and consumers (receivers). Hermalin and Katz study whether termination charges
can induce carriers to internalize the externalities that arise when both senders and receivers
of telecommunications messages enjoy benets. But in contrast to the framework of LMRT,
in which there two di¤erent types of users, they consider that any given user has a one-half
chance of being a sender and a one-half chance of being a receiver. In JLT, López (2010)
and this paper, however, every consumer both sends and receives tra¢ c, and moreover ob-
tains surplus from and is charged for placing and receiving calls. One common feature of
these papers is that they study the impact of termination charges on equilibrium calling and
reception charges in a framework where outgoing and incoming calls are unrelated. How-
ever, Cambini and Valletti (2008) argue that an exchange of information may yield further
exchanges (for example when calls made and received are complements), so they consider a
framework in which incoming and outgoing calls are interdependent. In the present paper
we characterize the equilibrium when two interconnected networks charge both for outgoing
and incoming calls, and the calls made and received are independent of each other. We
develop further the analysis of JLT and obtain new results that have implications for retail
pricing. However, the novelty of our analysis lies in studying how consumer expectations
a¤ect equilibrium end-user prices (and so equilibrium prot and welfare).
As it is well known, consumers expectations are crucial whenever externalities exist. Ex-
isting models of network competition in the spirit of ALRT implicitly assume that consumers
have what we term rationally responsive expectations. By this we mean that rst rms
set prices, second consumers form expectations about network sizes depending on the prices
charged by the rms, and third consumers make optimal subscription decisions (given the
prices and their expectations). This assumption implies that any change of a price by one
rm is assumed to lead to an instantaneous rational change in expectations of all consumers,
such that, given these new expectations, optimal subscription decisions will lead realized and
expected network sizes to coincide.
In Hurkens and López (2010) we show that the way consumers form expectations about
network sizes is crucial for the relationship between termination charges and equilibrium
prot. This is the case in which networks compete in nonlinear pricing, and under network-
based (i.e., on-net/o¤-net) price discrimination and the CPP principle. Implicitly assuming
rationally responsive expectations, La¤ont et al. (1998b) show that prot is strictly de-
creasing in termination charge. Building on their analysis, Gans and King (2001) show
furthermore that rms strictly prefer below cost termination charges. Intuitively, if termi-
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nation charge is above cost, then o¤-net calls will be more expensive than on-net calls. As
there is a price di¤erential between on- and o¤-net calls, consumers care about the size of
each network (the so-called tari¤-mediated network externalities) and so they prefer to join
the larger network. Consequently, acquisition costs are reduced, which in turn intensies
competition for subscribers and results in lower subscription fees. As a matter of fact this
result is at odds with real world observations since regulators around the world, and espe-
cially in the European Union, are concerned about too high termination charges. But at
the same time this result has been shown to be very robust. For example, it holds for any
number of networks [Calzada and Valletti, 2008], in the presence of call externalities [Berger,
2005], and when networks are asymmetric [López and Rey, 2009]. Also, Hurkens and Jeon
(2009) show that this result holds when there are both network externalities (i.e., elastic
subscription demand as in Dessein, 2003) and network-based price discrimination.
Nevertheless, in Hurkens and López (2010) we observe that a seemingly innocuous twist
of the modeling of consumer expectations reconcile the puzzle: rms prefer termination
charges above cost, and socially optimal termination charges are below or at cost (depend-
ing on the case that is under consideration).4 In particular, we relax the assumption of
rationally responsive expectations and replace it by one of fullled equilibrium expectations
(also termed passive  self-fullled  expectations)5, which implies the following: rst con-
sumers form expectations about network sizes, then rms compete, and nally consumers
make optimal subscription or purchasing decisions, given the expectations and the prices, so
that in equilibrium realized and expected network sizes coincide.
It is worth mentioning that a few recent papers also attempt to reconcile the mentioned
puzzle. Armstrong and Wright (2009)6, Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2010)7, and Ho-
ernig, Inderst and Valletti (2009)8 have in common that they introduce additional realistic
features of the telecommunication industry into the La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) frame-
work. They show that for some parameter range (and under rationally responsive expec-
tations) joint prots increase as the termination charge increases above the cost. However,
4This result is robust to the inclusion of call externalities, an arbitrary number of mobile operators,
asymmetric networks and elastic subscription demand.
5This concept was rst proposed by Katz and Shapiro (1985).
6Armstrong and Wright (2009) argue that if MTM and FTM termination charges must be chosen uni-
formly, as is in fact the case in most European countries, rms will trade o¤desirable high FTM and desirable
low MTM charges and arrive at some intermediate level, which may well be above cost.
7Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2010) argue that the willingness to pay for subscription is related to
the volume of calls. They introduce two types of users in the framework of ALRT: light users and heavy
users. Light users only receive calls and are assumed to have an elastic subscription demand. Instead, full
participation is assumed for heavy users, who can place calls and obtain a xed utility from receiving calls.
8Hoernig, Inderst and Valletti (2009) consider the existence of calling clubs so that the calling pattern is
not uniform but skewed.
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contrary to Hurkens and López (2010) these papers conclude that the need to regulate ter-
mination charges is reduced because the socially optimal termination charge would also be
above cost.
The implications of the assumption of how consumers form expectations on the relation-
ship between termination charges and equilibrium prot under the CPP principle motives
us to revisit the analysis of network competition in the presence of call externalities and the
receiver-pays regime by considering passive (self-fullled) expectations. A second motivation
for our analysis is provided by the current practice in the European Union that basically
consists of progressive reductions in termination charges. Until recently, most regulatory
authorities in Europe set termination charges above the (marginal) cost of termination so
as to recover the xed and common costs of an hypothetical e¢ cient network operator in-
curred in providing services in the retail and wholesale markets. In May 2009, the European
Commission recommended national regulatory authorities to set termination rates based on
the costs (i.e., the actual incremental cost of providing call termination   without allowing
for common costs) incurred by an e¢ cient operator.9 The European Commissions view was
also supported by the European regulators group, who in the Common Position adopted on
February 200810 decided to take a position in favor of setting a unique and uniform termina-
tion rate for all network operators at the cost incurred by an hypothetical e¢ cient operator.
As a result, the average MTR in Europe could drop from about 8.55 euro cents per minute
at the end of 2009, to approximately 2.5 euro cents per minute by 2012 [see Harbord and
Pagnozzi, 2010]. In light of these announcements, some large European mobile operators
as for instance Vodafone, warned the European Union that cutting termination rates could
mean the end of handset subsidies for consumers and lead to a price increase. Furthermore,
Vodafone claimed that cutting termination rates could result in a US style business model,
where users pay for both placing and receiving calls.
This issue has been explored (under rationally responsive expectations) in JLT (2004)
and more recently in López (2010)11. On the one hand, in the absence of network-based price
discrimination, mobile operators charge calls and call receptions at their o¤-net cost (even
if they are asymmetric in terms of market shares). This is the so-called o¤-net-cost pricing
9Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termi-
nation Rates in the EU (2009/396/EC).
10See "ERGs Common Position on symmetry of xed call termination rates and symmetry of mo-
bile call termination rates", adopted by the ERG-Plenary on 28th February 2008, p. 4-5. Available at
http://www.erg.eu.int.
11López (2010) generalizes the framework of JLT by allowing a random noise in both the callers and
receiversutilities, by removing the assumption (at some stages) the assumption of a given proportionality
between the utility functions, and by allowing asymmetry between mobile operators with respect to the
number of locked-in customers.
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principle12. Hence operators charge incoming calls only when the termination charge is
below cost (so as to recover the cost of providing the service of call termination).13 This is in
line with the fact that the countries where mobile operators apply the receiver-pays regime,
cited above, typically present below-cost termination charges. On the other hand, when
mobile operators can di¤erentiate their calling and reception charges according to whether
the communication is on- or o¤-net, connectivity is prone to break down. The reason is that
o¤-net calling and reception charges allow network operators to create direct externalities
on the customers of rival operators. If, for example, the callers obtain more utility than
the receivers from a given call, the attractiveness of the o¤er of the network where the call
is received will be reduced in comparison with the rivals o¤er. Therefore, to avoid a lose
of attractiveness, the terminating network will break connectivity by charging a too high
reception price.
Our paper examines the determination of competitive retail and reception charges in the
presence of passive (self-fullled) expectations. In particular, we explore the relationship
between termination charges and retail prices in the presence and absence of network-based
price discrimination. After introducing the setting, we examine the case of no network-based
price discrimination. We observe that the o¤-net-cost pricing principle is robust to the way
consumers form expectations about network sizes. The reason is that mobile operators
set marginal prices at the opportunity cost of stealingthe customers away from the rival
operators (this maximizes consumer surplus, which can then be extracted trough the xed
fee). As marginal prices do not depend on market shares, consumer expectations do not
alter them. This result has two implications. First, in equilibrium prot is neutral to the
level of the termination charge. Second, mobile operators only charge for incoming calls
when the termination charge is below cost, as it is in the presence of rationally responsive
expectations. By the same token, one would conclude that reception charges are negative
(rms subsidize call receptions) when the termination charge is above cost. Hence we discuss
the case in which the termination charge is above cost but reception charges cannot be
negative. The analysis concludes by determining the socially optimal prices: As optimality
requires a positive reception charge, optimal termination charge must be strictly below cost.
We then consider the case of network-based price discrimination. We show that con-
nectivity is prone to breakdown. The only possibility for a symmetric equilibrium without
connectivity breakdown exists when termination mark-up is negative. In this case the equilib-
rium is characterized by zero reception charge for o¤-net calls and positive reception charges
12The o¤-net-cost pricing principle dates back to LMRT, who found this pricing rule in a framework for
Internet backbone competition.
13Cambini and Valletti (2008) obtain the same result in their framework of information exchange between
calling parties with interdependency among outgoing and incoming calls.
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for on-net calls. The reason for our result to strongly di¤er from the ones of JLT (2004), who
describe equilibrium candidates for not too negative termination mark-ups is not caused by
our assumption about expectations. The characterization of usage prices is done in both
cases by assuming market shares constant (by adjusting the xed fee accordingly). Hence,
we nd the same candidates. The expectations play a role in determining the equilibrium
xed fees and determining equilibrium prots. However, we point out the local convexity
of the prot function with respect to o¤-net reception charge. Since we bound reception
charges below by zero, we sometimes nd a candidate solution with zero o¤-net reception
charges. If JLT (2004) would have discovered the non-concavity of the prot function, their
conclusion should have been that any symmetric equilibrium has connectivity breakdown.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. Section 3 examines
competition when network operators cannot discriminate on the basis of where the call
terminates. Section 4 allows networks to set di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls.
Section 5 concludes. The technical appendix presents some useful derivatives needed to
follow the analysis of the paper.
2 The model
We consider the framework developed by JLT (2004), which extends the traditional frame-
work of network competition by allowing receivers to obtain utility from receiving calls and
rms to charge call receptions.
There are two network operators, i = 1; 2, each providing full coverage.
Cost structure. The xed cost to serve each subscriber is f , whereas cO and cT denote
the marginal cost of providing a telephone call borne by the originating and terminating
networks. The marginal cost of an on-net call is then c  cO + cT . Network operators pay
each other a reciprocal access charge a when a call initiated on a network is terminated on
a di¤erent network.14 The termination mark-up is equal to:
m  a  cT .
The perceived cost of calls is the true cost c for on-net calls, augmented by the termination
mark-up for the o¤-net calls cO + a = c +m for the callers network. The marginal cost of
an o¤-net call is cT   a =  m for the receivers network.
Retail pricing. We consider competition in nonlinear pricing and two di¤erent cases:
i) Competition in the absence of network-based (i.e., on-net/o¤-net) price discrimination
14Reciprocity means that a network pays as much for termination of a call on the rival network as it
receives for completing a call originated on the rival network.
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(Section 3): Network i o¤ers three-part tari¤s fFi; pi; rig, where Fi is the monthly subscriber
charge, pi is the per-unit calling price and ri is the per-unit reception charge; ii) Competition
under network-based discrimination (Section 4): Network i o¤ers ve-part tari¤s of the form:
fFi; pi; bpi; ri; brig, where bpi and bri denote the o¤-net calling and reception charges.
Market shares. The networks (i.e., rms) sell a di¤erentiated but substitutable prod-
uct. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the segment [0; 1] and the two networks are
located at the two extremities of the segment (x1 = 0, x2 = 1). Given income y, a consumer
located at x and joining network i has utility
y + v0   t jx  xij+ wi;
where v0 represents a xed surplus from being connected to either network (it is assumed
to be large enough so that all consumers want to subscribe to one network), t jx  xij is the
cost of subscribing to a network with "address" xi, and wi is the net surplus of a network-i
consumer from making and receiving calls on that network. Network 1s market share is
given by
1 =
1
2
+ (w1   w2), (1)
where   1=2t measures the degree of substitutability between the two networks. As there
is full participation, 2s market share is 2 = 1  1.
Individual demand. Subscribers obtain positive utility frommaking and receiving calls.
The callers utility from making a call of length q minutes is u(q), whereas the receivers iseu(q) from receiving a call of that length. u() and eu() are twice continuously di¤erentiable,
and concave. For tractability, we assume that
eu(q) = u(q) with  > 0.
We consider the case in which callers and receivers can hang up. To avoid multiplicity of
equilibria,15 we assume that the utility that a receiver derives from receiving a call is subject
to a noise ": eu(q) + "q.
" follows the distribution function F (), with wide enough support ["; "], zero mean, and
density function f(), which is strictly positive for all " in the support. Additionally, " is
identically and independently distributed for each caller-receiver pair.
15In the absence of noise and assuming that the caller determines the volume of calls, we have that from
the viewpoint of networks and subscribers only the sum fFi+ rieqg matters, not its composition. As a result,
di¤erent combinations of Fi and ri are feasible equilibria but nonequivalent since each combination may
a¤ect di¤erently the rival network.
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As receivers are allowed to hang up, for a given pair of prices (pi; rj) the length of a
call from a caller of network i to a receiver of network j is given by q(max(pi; (rj   ")=)).
Therefore, the volume of calls from network i to network j is ijD(pi; rj) with
D(pi; rj)  [1  F (rj   pi)]q(pi) +
Z rj pi
"
q

rj   "


f(")d".
Similarly, the utility that a network-i consumer obtains from placing calls to network-j
consumers is jU(pi; rj) with
U(pi; rj)  [1  F (rj   pi)]u(q(pi)) +
Z rj pi
"
u

q

rj   "


f(")d".
Notice that
@U(pi; rj)
@pi
= pi
@D(pi; rj)
@pi
. (2)
The utility that a network-j consumer obtains from receiving calls from network-i consumers
is i eU(pi; rj) with
eU(pi; rj)  Z "
rj pi
[eu(q(pi)) + "q(pi)] f(")d"
+
Z rj pi
"
euqrj   "


+ "q

rj   "


f(")d".
And,
@ eU(pi; rj)
@rj
= rj
@D(pi; rj)
@rj
. (3)
We make the standard assumption of a balanced calling pattern, which means that the
percentage of calls originating on a given network and completed on another given (including
the same) network is equal to the fraction of consumers subscribing to the terminating
network.16
Timing. We assume that the terms of interconnection are negotiated or established by
a regulator rst. Then, for a given access charge a (or equivalently, a given m) the timing
of the game is the following:
1. Consumers form expectations about the number of subscribers of each network i
(i) with 1  0, 2  0 and 1 + 2 = 1.
16Dessein (2003, 2004) examines how unbalanced calling patterns between di¤erent customer types a¤ect
retail competition when network operators compete in the presence of the caller-pays regime.
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2. Firms take these expectations as given and choose simultaneously retail tari¤s: i) in
the absence of network-based price discrimination: Ti = (Fi; pi; ri) for i = 1; 2; ii) in
the presence of network-based price discrimination: Ti = (Fi; pi; bpi; ri; bri) for i = 1; 2.
3. Consumers make rational subscription and consumption decisions, given their expec-
tations and given the networkstari¤s.
Therefore, market share i is a function of prices and consumer expectations. Self-
fullling expectations imply that at equilibrium i = i.
3 No Network-Based Price Discrimination
In this section, we consider (for a given reciprocal access charge a and consumer expectations
1 and 2) competition in the presence of the receiver-pays regime and under the assumption
of nondiscriminatory pricing (network operators are not allowed to charge their customers
di¤erent prices for calls terminating on- and o¤-net).
Given the balanced calling pattern assumption and consumer expectations 1 and 2,
the surplus from subscribing to network i (gross of transportation costs) is given by
wi = i(i; pi; ri; pj; rj)  Fi
with
i(i; pi; ri; pj; rj) = iU(pi; ri) + jU(pi; rj) + i eU(pi; ri) + j eU(pj; ri)
 pi

iD(pi; ri) + jD(pi; rj)
  ri iD(pi; ri) + jD(pj; ri) .
When consumers expectations are assumed passive we have that wi is a function of ex-
pectations and prices, instead of market shares and prices as it is in the case of rationally
responsive expectations. The passive expectations assumption simplies the analysis and,
as we will show below, does not change the results in the absence of price discrimination.
The prot of network i can be written as (for i 6= j = 1; 2):
i = i[i(pi   c)D(pi; ri) + j(pi   c m)D(pi; rj) + jmD(pj; ri) (4)
+ri(iD(pi; ri) + jD(pj; ri)) + Fi   f ]:
Adjusting Fi so as to maintain net surpluses w1 and w2 and thus market shares constant,
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leads network i to set pi and ri so as to maximize
i = i[i(pi   c)D(pi; ri) + j(pi   c m)D(pi; rj) + jmD(pj; ri) (5)
+ri(iD(pi; ri) + jD(pj; ri)) + i(i; pi; ri; pj; rj)  j(j; pj; rj; pi; ri)
+Fj   1

(i   1
2
)  f ].
Assume that ri = rj = r, by di¤erentiating (5) with respect to pi and using (2), we obtain
the following rst-order condition:
pi = c+ jm  ir. (6)
Similarly, assuming pi = pj = p, and by di¤erentiating (5) with respect to ri and using (3),
we obtain the following rst-order condition:
ri = ic  jm  ip. (7)
If pi = p and ri = r, equations (6) and (7) simplify to
p = c+m; (8)
r =  m: (9)
Thus, in equilibrium p and r do not depend on market shares, and network operators charge
calls and call receptions at their o¤-net cost.17 This is the so-called o¤-net-cost pricing
principle18: Each network sets prices for a subscribers outgoing and incoming tra¢ c at the
marginal cost that it would incur if all other subscribers belonged to the rival network. To
understand this result, notice that the o¤-net cost is also the opportunity cost of stealing
the customers away from the rival network.19 As usual with two-part tari¤s, rms set
the marginal price(s) at marginal cost so as to maximize the consumer surplus, which can
then be extracted through the xed part. JLT and López (2010) also nd this pricing
rule under the assumption of rationally responsive expectations. Therefore the o¤-net-cost
pricing principle is robust to the assumption of consumer expectations. The reason is that
17This equilibrium is the unique symmetric equilibrium and exists for m   


1+

c (see proof of Propo-
sition 6 in Jeon et al. [2001, Appendix 3]).
18The o¤-net-cost pricing principle dates back to La¤ont et al. (2003), who found this pricing rule in a
framework for Internet backbone competition.
19The opportunity cost of stealing a caller away from the rival network is cO + a = c +m, whereas the
opportunity cost of stealing a receiver away from the rival network is cO   a =  m. See López (2010) for a
complete characterization of the o¤-net-cost pricing equilibrium.
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rms set marginal prices at the opportunity cost of stealing the customers away from the
rivals, and so marginal prices do not depend on market shares. The way consumers form
expectations is then irrelevant for the level of the equilibrium marginal prices.
By setting calling and reception charges at the o¤-net cost, we have that i = 12  
 (Fi   Fj) (for i 6= j = 1; 2). At equilibrium, market shares do not depend on expectations
because there is full participation and, as commented above, usage prices are independent
of market shares and symmetric. Thus, is prot can be rewritten as follows:
i =

1
2
  (Fi   Fj)

(Fi   f). (10)
Solving the rst-order conditions, we obtain the equilibrium xed fees Fi = f + 12 . The
equilibrium prot is therefore i = 14 , which is the prot that each network would obtain
under unit demands. We also have that at equilibrium, prots are independent of the level
of the access charge. As López (2010) points out, the reason is that all call activities yield
zero prot: on-net calls cost (per unit) c and yield revenue (per unit) p+ r = c, originating
an o¤-net call costs cO + a while it yields revenue p = c + m = cO + a, and the cost of
terminating an o¤-net call is cO while it yields revenue a+ r = a m = cO.
If reception charges are restricted to be non-negative, the above analysis is only correct
for m  0, that is, for termination charges below the cost of termination. Suppose m > 0
and reception charges cannot be negative. Then it will be optimal to set reception charges
at the minimum, i.e., r1 = r2 = r = 0. Hence, if termination charges are above cost, rms
will not charge consumers for the reception of calls, even if they are allowed to do so. And
the optimal call price will then be p1 = p2 = p = c + m2 . In this case, call charges are again
set at average marginal cost, but reception is charged (at zero) above the true cost of
termination  m < 0. Firms now do make prots from tra¢ c, in particular from terminating
calls. Given the symmetry in call and reception charges, market share is again given by
i =
1
2
  (Fi   Fj). Hence, rms choose the xed fee so as to maximize
i = i(mq(p) + Fi   f) (11)
The rst-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium now reads
0 =  (mq(p) + F   f) + 1
2
so that F = f + 1
2
  mq(p) and equilibrium prot equals, again, 1=(4).20 We have the
20This equilibrium exists and is unique when  or m are not too high (see proof of Proposition 7 in La¤ont
et al. [1998a, Appendix B]).
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following,
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) (i) if  


1+

c < m < 0, then as the noise vanishes there
exists a unique symmetric equilibrium where marginal prices are set at the o¤-net cost (p =
c+m and r =  m), F = f + 1
2
and prot is neutral to the termination charge:  = 1
4
; (ii)
if m  0 and reception charges cannot be negative, then (for  and m not too high) there
exists a unique equilibrium in which p = c + m
2
, r = 0, F = f + 1
2
 mq(c + m
2
) and prot
is neutral to the termination charge:  = 1
4
.
The prot neutrality result is independent of the exact specication of the randomness
in the marginal utility for receivers. In particular, it holds even if noise does not vanish.
However, in order to determine the socially optimal prices we will assume that noise vanishes
in the following regular way (similar to the denition in JLT):
Denition 2 A sequence of distributions Fn(") with zero mean on domain ["; "] is called
regular if for any continuous function h() we have
lim
n!1
E[h(")j"  "0] = h("0) for all "0  0
and
lim
n!1
E[h(")j"  "0] = h("0) for all "0  0:
It is straightforward to show that the optimal call and reception prices converge to
(p; r) = ( c
1+
; c
1+
) when noise vanishes in a regular way. The intuition is that e¢ ciency
requires, in the limit, that the volume of calls q satises u0(q) + ~u0(q)   c = 0. Since some-
times callers will determine volume and sometimes receivers will determine the volume, the
optimal prices are (p; r). Notice that optimality requires a positive reception charge and
therefore m must be strictly negative. In fact, the socially optimal reception charge will be
m =
 c
1 + 
:
4 Termination-based price discrimination
In this section we allow the rms to set a xed fee and (non-negative) prices for making and
receiving calls that can depend on the network receiving and originating the call. That is,
rm i chooses (Fi; pi; ri; p^i; r^i). We use the same set-up as in JLT (2004), except for the fact
that we do not allow for negative reception charges and that we assume that consumers form
expectations in a passive way.
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Since we assume that all consumers subscribe to one of the networks, we can use the
method of maximizing prots with respect to usage prices for making and receiving calls,
keeping market share constant, by adapting the xed fee accordingly. It is not surprising
that the usage prices in a symmetric equilibrium candidate we nd are the same as the ones
found by JLT (2004) under the assumption that consumer expectations vary with respect
to prices. For completeness, we include the analysis. We will again assume that there is
randomness in the marginal utility of receivers and that this noise vanishes in a regular way.
We start the analysis with the market for on-net calls. It is optimal for network i to
maximize the size of the pie for on-net calls. The rst-order conditions with respect to pi
reads
d[U(pi; ri) + ~U(pi; ri)  cD(pi; ri)]
dpi
= 0;
while the one with respect to ri reads
d[U(pi; ri) + ~U(pi; ri)  cD(pi; ri)]
dri
= 0:
As the noise vanishes, these equations can be solved to yield pi = c=(1 + )  p and
ri = c=( + 1) = p
  r. (This is the same exercise as determining the socially optimal
call and reception prices, as we did in the previous section.)
It is clear that there always exists an equilibrium with both o¤-net call and reception
charges equal to innity, so that no o¤-net calls will be made. This is independent of the level
of the termination mark-up. Both networks then just o¤er e¢ cient levels of on-net tra¢ c and
compete for subscribers by means of the xed fees. When consumers expect both networks
to be of equal size, then the equilibrium xed fees will be equal to f +1=(2). Prots will be
equal to 1=(4) for each rm. This type of equilibrium is pretty bad in generating consumer
surplus as only on-net calls will be made. Clearly, if there are more than two networks this
type of equilibrium is even worse.
We now solve for the optimal o¤-net call and reception charges in an equilibrium without
connectivity breakdown. When consumers expect market shares to be equal, to keep true
market shares constant at one half, network i should adjust xed fee as follows:
Fi = Fj +
1
2
n
U(p^i; r^j) + ~U(p^j; r^i)  p^iD(p^i; r^j)  r^iD(p^j; r^i)
 U(p^j; r^i)  ~U(p^i; r^j) + p^jD(p^j; r^i) + r^jD(p^i; r^j)
o
:
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The rst-order derivative of prot with respect to p^i reads
1
4
[
@U(p^i; r^j)
@p^i
  (c+m  r^j)@D(p^i; r^j)
@p^i
  @
~U(p^i; r^j)
@p^i
]:
This can be rewritten as
1
4
[p^i   (c+m  r^j)  p^i   E[" j "  r^j   p^i]]@D(p^i; r^j)
@p^i
:
The rst-order derivative of  with respect to r^i, keeping market share constant at one
half, reads
1
4
[
@ ~U(p^j; r^i)
@r^i
+ (p^j +m)
@D(p^j; r^i)
@r^i
  @U(p^j; r^i)
@r^i
]:
This can be rewritten as
1
4
[
Z r^i p^j
"
1

[r^i + p^j +m  r^i   "

]q0(
r^i   "

)f(")d"];
which in turn is equal to
1
4
F (r^i   p^j)E((r^i + p^j +m  r^i   "

)q0(
r^i   "

) j "  r^i   p^j):
Let F (n) represent a series of noise distributions that is regular according our denition.
Let (p^(n); r^(n)) denote the corresponding symmetric equilibrium candidate usage prices. By
taking a suitable subsequence one may assume that either r^n   p^n  0 for all n or that
r^n   p^n  0 for all n.
Consider the rst case. Then in the limit, as noise vanishes, the limit point (p^; r^) must
satisfy r^   p^  0 and
0 = (1  )p^  c m+ r^ (12)
0 = r^ +m (13)
so that r^ =  m and p^ = (c+ 2m)=(1  ). The condition r^  p^  0 is satised if and only
if m   c=(1 + ). (Note that these symmetric candidate equilibrium usage prices were
reported in JLT (2004).)
Consider the second case next. Then in the limit, as noise vanishes, the limit point (p^; r^)
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must satisfy r^   p^  0 and
0 = p^  c m (14)
0 = r^(1  1=) + p^+m (15)
so that p^ = c +m and r^ = (c + 2m)=(1  ). The condition r^   p^  0 is satised if and
only if m   c=(1 + ). JLT (2004) discard this candidate equilibrium on the ground of
second-order considerations.
In fact, the second-order derivative of prots with respect to r^ is strictly positive at the
equilibrium candidate, also in the rst case. Namely, at r^ =  m
@2
@r^2i
=
1
4
(1  1

)q0(p^)F (r^   p^)= > 0:
If  m  0 then the optimal reception charge must be 1, since increasing the reception
charge will then improve prots. Hence, for m  0 the only symmetric equilibrium is the
one with connectivity breakdown. For m < 0 and thus  m > 0, the unique equilibrium
candidate with r^ < p^ is the one with minimal reception charge, i.e. with r^ = 0, and thus
p^ = (c+m)=(1  ).
Let us consider the xed fee in a symmetric equilibrium candidate without connectivity
breakdown. Because of passive expectations and symmetric usage prices, 1 = 12+(F2 F1).
Prot made from tra¢ c on network i equals i(1  i)R^ where R^ = (p^  c)q(p^). Network i
thus maximizes
i((1  i)R^ + Fi   f):
In a symmetric equilibrium we thus have F1 = F2 = f + 12 and prots are maximized when
R^ is maximized.
From the point of the rms, the prot maximizing termination mark-up thus satises
(c + m)=(1   ) = pM or m = pM(1   )   c, if the latter expression exceeds  cT and is
negative. For this to be feasible the call externality (that is, ) should be su¢ ciently strong.
Bill and Keep (m =  cT ) is optimal if pM(1  )  c <  cT . Otherwise the optimal m will
be the largest m < 0 for which an equilibrium without connectivity breakdown exists. We
will denote this by m.
From a social point of view, the optimal termination charge would be the one that makes
the o¤-net call price equal to p = c=(1 + ). This requires m =  2c=(1 + ). Clearly, this
requires the regulator to know precisely the value of . If the regulator faces uncertainty
about this value, it may be a second-best but secure option to have Bill and Keep.
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Proposition 3 (i) As the noise vanishes, the unique symmetric equilibrium candidate with-
out connectivity breakdown has
p =
c
1 + 
; r =
c
1 + 
; p^ = (c+m)=(1  ); r^ = 0; F = f + 1
2
;
yielding equilibrium prot
 =
1
2
+
1
4
(p^  c)q(p^):
(ii) The prot maximizing termination mark-up satises
m = minf m;maxf cT ; pM(1  )  cgg:
(iii) The social welfare maximizing termination mark-up equals
m = maxf cT ; 2c=(1 + )g:
5 Concluding remarks
We have analyzed how termination charges a¤ect retail price competition when rms can
charge consumers for receiving calls. Compared to earlier literature on this topic we assume
that consumers form expectations about network sizes in a passive, but ex-post rational
way. Moreover, we restrict reception charges to be non-negative. When rms cannot set
di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net tra¢ c, expectations over network sizes do not matter
and we obtain the standard prot neutrality result in this case. Firms will set a positive
reception charge only if termination charge is below termination cost. In this sense we conrm
European operatorswarnings that further reductions in termination charges may end the
Calling Party Pays Regime. This is not necessarily a bad thing in terms of social welfare.
In fact, when receiversutility is random and thus receivers sometimes determine the call
volume, it is optimal to have strictly positive reception charges. This can only be achieved
by setting termination charge below cost. On the other hand, a symmetric equilibrium with
positive reception charges only exists if receivers utility is su¢ ciently high. If receiver and
caller derive the same benet, and if termination cost constitutes half of the total cost of a
call, then Bill and Keep leads to the socially optimal outcome. (DeGraba (2003) makes this
point without formal model.) In this case call and reception charges are the same. This may
resemble the situation in the US market pretty well.
When rms are allowed to distinguish between on-net and o¤-net tra¢ c, we already know
from Hurkens and López (2010) that the way expectations are formed are very important
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under a CPP regime. Firms typically will prefer high termination charges while below or
at cost termination charges are optimal from a social point of view. This is also true for
relatively low levels of receiver utility. Only for very strong levels of call externalities rms
would prefer below cost termination charges. The fact that most operators in Europe strongly
oppose cuts in termination rates suggests that call externalities are not believed to be very
strong.
Under the RPP regime we have shown that with termination based-price discrimination
rms will charge on-net reception (since this maximizes the surplus from on-net tra¢ c when
there is vanishing noise in the receivers utility. However, extremely high o¤-net reception
charges will often lead to connectivity breakdown. In particular, this must occur when
the termination mark-up is nonnegative. For a negative termination mark-up, a symmetric
equilibrium without connectivity breakdown may exist. It is characterized by zero reception
charges o¤-net.
Our ndings shed some light on how termination rates may a¤ect the business model used
in di¤erent countries. While in Europe high termination rates exist, it is optimal for the
operators to stick to a CPP regime. Otherwise either connectivity breakdown becomes an
issue (which hurts all consumers) or rms will be forced to agree not to use termination-based
price discrimination. In both cases prots will be much lower. In countries as the US with
low termination rates, it is optimal to charge consumers for receiving calls to as to recover
some of the costs related to termination service. Firms may prefer to use termination-based
price discrimination in this case, as it opens the possibility of an equilibrium with higher
prots. However, it also creates the problem that connectivity breakdown may occur. And
once rms stick to the RPP regime and do not use termination-based price discrimination,
they have no incentive to try to manipulate the termination rates because of the prot
neutrality results.
Apart from the di¤erence between Europe and the US in termination rates and the
regimes used, there is the matter of penetration, which is much higher in Europe. In order
to address how penetration rates are related to termination rates and pay regimes, we need
to allow for elastic subscription demand. We plan to do so in the near future.
APPENDIX
We introduce some notation and derive some useful derivatives.
Dene
Dij = D(pi; rj) = [1  F (rj   pi)]q(pi) +
Z rj pi
"
q(
rj   "

)f")d";
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Uij = U(pi; rj) = [1  F (rj   pi)]u(q(pi))
+
Z rj pi
"
u(q(
rj   "

))f(")d";
and
~Uij = ~U(pi; rj) =
Z "
rj pi
[u(q(pi)) + "q(pi)]f(")d"
+
Z rj pi
"
[u(q(
rj   "

)) + "q(
rj   "

)]f(")d":
Then,
@Dij
@pi
= [1  F (rj   pi)]q0(pi)
and
@Dij
@rj
=
Z rj pi
"
1

q0(
rj   "

)f(")d":
Further,
@Uij
@pi
= [1  F (rj   pi)]piq0(pi) = pi@Dij
@pi
:
and
@Uij
@rj
=
Z rj pi
"
1

rj   "

q0(
rj   "

)f(")d":
Finally,
@ ~Uij
@pi
=
Z "
rj pi
(pi + ")q
0(pi)f(")d"
and
@ ~Uij
@rj
=
Z rj pi
"
rjq
0(
rj   "

)
1

f(")d" = rj
@Dij
@rj
:
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